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The European experience of cleavage formation differs from that in many 
new democracies in that large-scale processes of social transformation (like 
state formation and industrialization) often did non coincide with suffrage 
extensions in the latter. This often hindered the formation of collective 
identities based on class and religion, meaning that cleavages in new 
democracies are often more political than sociological in nature. This, in turn, 
implies that political leadership at critical junctures has tended to be more 
important, producing more diverse outcomes in terms of the nature of 
political divides that in Western Europe. A further element in new 
democracies that makes the link between social divisions and those 
represented in the party system more tenuous is that competition tends to be 
less open. For example, restrictions on the participation of left-wing parties 
can suppress economic cleavages at the advantage of cultural ones.  
But party systems in more recent democracies are not uniformly less 
anchored in social divisions. Rather, they exhibit much more variance in this 
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respect as compared to the older democracies. It is this variance that we 
should exploit in order to learn more about the conditions that make for 
discrepancies between social divisions and party system divisions.  
In the first section of this short paper, I start out with a few reflections on the 
cleavage concept and in particular on the idea of a mass-elite divergence in 
political cleavages. Both the initial formation, as well as the subsequent 
perpetuation of cleavages involves top-down and bottom-up processes. 
Agency is always crucial, also in the old democracies, and assessing mass-
elite divergences is therefore not an easy task. Acknowledging that 
representation is a dynamic process, the approach I have taken is to measure 
to which degree party systems are responsive to voters’ substantive policy 
preferences, which I call party system responsiveness. 
In the second section, I say something about possible differences between the 
old and more recent democracies, drawing on my work on the historical 
origins of party system responsiveness in Latin America. In explaining 
country differences, I argue that the initial formation of responsive party 
systems is decisive. In this process, the degree of political polarization is 
crucial, because when polarization is strong, it creates the political identities 
that anchor party systems in the populace – the kind of anchoring implied in 
the term cleavage. The impact of historical polarization is enduring because 
party systems built on strong links between parties and social groups tend to 
adapt to new demands and social change, much like those in the older 
democracies.  
In the third section, I address a third issue highlighted in the background 
paper I was asked to comment on, namely, how parties position themselves 
on competitive dimensions that are secondary to their main ideological 
appeal (Section III-2-D, entitled “Irresponsible and Inconsistent Commitment 
on Socio-economic Issues: Beyond East Asia). My focus here is on the populist 






1. Cleavages and agency 
 
The appeal of the cleavage concept lies in its capacity to link individual and 
group political behavior to large scale-divisions in society. In my reading, 
mobilization from below and from above invariably interact in cleavage 
formation. In order to engage in collective political action, voters need 
interpretative frames that allow them to interpret grievances and form 
preferences and collective identities based on common social-structural 
positions (see also Tarrow 1992). Leadership by elites, in other words, is 
crucial, as many cleavage theorists highlight (e.g., Enyedi 2005; Deegan-
Krause 2006; Zuckerman 1975). Beyond the collective action problem, elite 
agency is also crucial because every individual belong to multiple groups that 
are potentially relevant politically. Following Stryker (1980, 2000), we can 
think of identities such as those linked to class, religion, or ethnicity as 
arranged in a hierarchy of salience. And the positions of individuals’ various 
group memberships in this salience hierarchy is shaped, I would argue, by 
political conflict (Bornschier 2010; see also Coser 1956). In order for cleavages 
to remain salient, then, they have to engender continued conflict. Hence, 
political actors again take central stage. Although I would claim that agency is 
even more important in new democracies (I explain why below), its central 
role is also evident in Western European party systems, where social divisions 
have tended to be strongly cross-cutting. So while we find the state-market 
and the religious cleavages almost everywhere in Europe, the degree to which 
mobilized cleavages cross-cut or reinforced each other depended crucially on 
elite strategies (see Manow 2015).  
For this reason, I am a bit reluctant to adopt the terminology of a “divergence 
between mass and elite cleavages”, because I would reserve the term cleavage 
for those cases where divisions at the mass and elite levels coincide. There is a 
large number of divides in society that are potentially relevant in political 
terms, and in a view informed by Schattschneider (1975[1960]), party systems 
are always more responsive to some conflicts than to others. I agree with the 
background paper, however, in that we need not reserve the term cleavage 
for instances where political divides are clearly anchored in social structure. 
Bartolini and Mair's (1990) well-known definition is overly restrictive in this 
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respect, making it difficult for the cleavage concept to travel to other contexts, 
where political divisions are less strongly anchored in social structure and 
more political in nature.1 But the restrictive definition is also inadequate for 
the Western European cases: Even if cleavages may have exhibited more 
homogeneity at the moment of their initial mobilization, their subsequent 
reproduction depends on the patterns of interaction in party systems, and is 
thus to a significant extent genuinely political more than social. Thus, cleavages 
tend to at least in part become a product of politics itself (Mair 1997, 2001; 
Bornschier 2010).  
From the perspective of programmatic representation – or party system 
responsiveness, as I call it – there has been some recent theorizing that seeks 
to bring models of representation closer to the observed reality. In making the 
case for a “mobilization conception of political representation”, Disch (2011) 
argues that our conceptions of representation needs to come to terms with the 
empirical finding that the influence between voters and parties is reciprocal: 
Parties do not simply represent voters’ interests, as in Pitkin's (1967) liberal 
conception of representation, but they also shape their voters’ very 
preferences and give them guidance on how to form preferences concerning 
new political issues.   
From this point of view, what Jaemin calls a divergence of mass-elite political 
cleavages for me refers to contexts in which party systems lack programmatic  
responsiveness vis-à-vis voters. This is the terminology that I will adopt in 
this paper. I agree with Jaemin, on the other hand, that Bartolini and Mair’s 
(1990) canonical definition of cleavage lacks the temporal dimension: We 
generally reserve the term for political divisions that are rather stable (Tóka 
1998), where generations of voters are socialized into an interpretation of 
political grievances and conflict in terms of the major dividing lines 





1  Deegan-Krause (2009) offers a conceptualization of different types of divides that do not 
meet the criteria for full cleavages.  
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2. The politicization of social divisions in Latin America: Party system 
responsiveness in new democracies 
 
Due to the temporal coincidence of suffrage extensions and with the 
mobilization of specific social groups in Western Europe, the dividing lines 
represented in party systems coincided with major social divisions in this 
context, at least until the late 1960s: All party systems in Western Europe were 
and continue to be responsive to at least some social divisions. Put differently, 
the older democracies offer little variance in this respect. We can thus learn a 
lot about the conditions that make party systems responsive to social 
conflicts, then, by looking at new democracies: The link between social 
divisions and those represented in the party system is more tenuous here. I 
see two principal reasons for this. 
(1) For one thing, this is due to the lack of coincidence between major social change 
and suffrage extension, as pointed out in the background paper (p. 13). As a 
consequence, social identities related to religion and class are weaker for 
example in Latin America (for the class cleavage, it also matters that lower 
levels of industrialization and made for a working class that was also 
substantially smaller in size than in the advanced democracies at the time of 
suffrage expansion). Perhaps this created less pressure for representation 
from below than in the old democracies. On the other hand, there was also a 
lot of repression of bottom-up organized parties. Either the pressure was not 
so strong as to dissuade elites from using repression, or the capacity for 
repression on the part of established elites was stronger in the newer 
democracies than it was in early 20th century Europe.2 The delicate balance of 
power between established and new actors directly affects the next issue I 
would like to highlight, namely, variation in the degree to which competition 
was open or restricted. 
(2) Indeed, competition is often restricted in new democracies. This, in turn, is 
due to at least two factors: The first has to do with restrictions against specific 
parties. In 20th Century Latin America, these were often Communist or other 
																																																								
2  Both the strength of mobilization from below, as well as the capacity of the established 
elites to restrict completion is best thought of in terms of Dahl’s (1971) trade-off between 
the cost of toleration of opposition vs. the costs of repression.  
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left-wing parties that were deemed too radical, particularly in the Cold War 
context or during pacted transitions to democracy, when established actors 
had a lot of leeway in defining the rules of the game. In the MENA region 
today, the same can be true for Islamist parties. In my work on Latin 
American party systems, I found that inhibiting left-wing parties from 
competing often has far-reaching and long-term implications for 
programmatic responsiveness. The reason is that the marginalization of 
competitors limits the inducements established parties have to maintain 
distinctive policy platforms. Without open contestation, the dynamic of 
competition changes: A mainstream (center-)left party challenged by a more 
leftist competitor is likely to lose to this competitor if it moves to the center. If 
contestation is restricted, on the other hand, left-leaning voters have nowhere 
else to go. Consequently, center-left parties do not face immediate losses 
when they collude with their mainstream center-right counterparts and 
eliminate programmatic distinctiveness. Curtailing competition also destroys 
parties’ incentives to adapt to new social demands. 
The second factor that restricts programmatic competition is the presence of 
non-programmatic linkages between parties and voters, as argued in the 
background paper. The predominance of clientelism skews the playing field 
between governing parties and challengers in favor of the first, using Levitsky 
and Way’s (2010a, 2010b) terminology. Again, this limits parties’ needs to 
adapt to new programmatic demands. The pervasiveness of clientelism in 
new democracies, I would argue, is often due to a lack of programmatic 
differentiation: Where party systems are polarized along programmatic lines, 
this diminishes the role of clientelism as a strategy of mobilization. 
In sum, my research on party systems in Latin America showed that whether 
a country experienced extended periods of polarization or whether polarization 
was aborted is the key variable explaining why some party systems are more  
responsive to voter preferences than others even decades later (Bornschier 
2016). The relevant dimensions of competition in Latin America are the state-
market and the democratic regime dimension (the latter given the recent 
history of military dictatorships in the 1970s into the 1980s). Some party 
systems in the region are highly responsive to voter’ programmatic 
preferences, while others are not. When competition was open in the first half 
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of the 20th Century, this generally resulted in high levels of polarization in the 
party system along the state-market dimension. These polarized party 
positions created clear alternatives for voters, and made them base their vote 
on their preferences vis-à-vis state intervention or market liberalism (Chile, 
Uruguay, and Argentina). Restrictions on the participation of left-wing 
parties, on the other hand, mitigated polarization. This often implied that 
economic cleavages were suppressed at the advantage of cultural ones 
(Colombia), or that party systems became anchored in clientelistic, rather than 
programmatic linkages (Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, and others). The 
most important factor3 shaping whether competition was open and the left 
tolerated was the strength of the right, because this shaped the ability of 
conservative forces to defend their interests in the electoral arena. 4  The 
balance of power between left and right is thus crucial in making polarization 
possible, which in turn fosters responsiveness.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, the economic cleavage was then often complemented 
by a regime divide between defenders of the prior military regimes and 
proponents of democracy. At times, as in Chile and Brazil, this dimension was 
even more important in shaping partisan alignments than the economic 
cleavage. Its overall effect of responsiveness was positive because the regime 
cleavage overlaps with, rather than crosscuts the economic cleavage (and 
when the regime issue became less important, the economic dimension grew 
in importance).  
With respect to what Jaemin suggests for Taiwan, Korea and Japan, and 
without really knowing these countries, I would not simply rule out that 
regime or foreign policy divides can be more salient to voters than economic 
ones. We cannot read off a mass-elite discrepancy in political divisions solely 
from the fact that economic preferences are not politicized (just as the 
predominance of cultural cleavage in contemporary Western Europe for some 
groups of voters does not imply that party systems are cartelized, as I discuss 
below). The presence of left-wing parties in Japan suggests that the second 
mechanism depicted above – the restriction of parties’ programmatic offer –
was not a major factor there. On the other hand, the clientelistic nature of the 																																																								
3 In Slater and Simmons’ (2010) terms, it represents a “critical antecedent” because it 
heavily shapes, but by itself does not predict the final outcome. 
4  A similar point is made with respect to democratization in Europe by Ziblatt (2017).	
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Japanese party system may have inhibited these parties from attaining 
sizeable vote shares, and from shifting the dominant dimension of 
competition towards a state-market cleavage.  
My suggestion is that we focus not only on negative cases where the link 
between social divisions and party system divides is tenuous, but that we 
exploit the full variance and learn from those new democracies where parties 
are in fact responsive to voter preferences. It is this variance that allows us to 
learn more about the conditions that make for discrepancies between social 
divisions and party system divisions.  
 
 
3. Irresponsible and inconsistent commitment to socio-economic issues –  
beyond East Asia 
 
The Latin American cases suggest that the failure of elites to offer voters a 
substantive choice in economic policy making is indeed the result of party 
system cartelization (caused by restrictions in political competition or  elites’ 
reliance on clientelistic linkages). The same may be true, according to the 
background paper, in East Asia. But the situation is quite different in the old 
democracies. Competition is genuinely open here. For those supporting the 
radical populist right in Western Europe, the economic dimension is indeed 
secondary to the cultural one. These voters’ anti-universalistic preferences are 
represented well by right-wing populist parties. Along the economic 
dimension, these parties have come to occupy centrist or center-left positions 
(with the exception of the Swiss People’s Party), a position that has brought 
them closer to their core voters from the manual working class (see 
Bornschier 2018 for an overview of the literature). If people vote for these 
parties, it is because they are better agents to represent their preferences than 
mainstream parties, and not because party systems are in any way cartelized.  
There is a clear difference between the new democracies I have been talking 
about and the older ones in Western Europe, then, in that clientelism is far 
less important (with the possible exception of Southern Europe), and that 
competition is not restricted. The mushrooming of new parties in Europe 
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clearly suggests that the cartelization thesis is mistaken. Most of the new 
parties are not simply anti-establishment parties, but advocate clear stances 
on substantive policy dimensions.  
In other words, the polarization of the new cultural divide in Western Europe 
is indeed diminishing the salience of the economic state-market dimension for 
parts of the electorate. But it is not curtailing voter choice – there are plenty of 
radical left and left-wing populist parties around to represent voters with 
state interventionist views. The new cultural conflict between the 
universalism of the New Left and the populist right’s traditionalist-
communitarian counter-model is simply more salient to many voters than the 
traditional economic cleavage. Economic preferences may not be irrelevant 
for those for whom the cultural dimension is prime, but they are in part 
interpreted by these voters in cultural terms (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015). 
In line with what Schattschneider (1975 [1960]) wrote, politics is still a 
struggle about meaning, and more specifically, about the interpretation of 
what the relevant dimensions of conflict are. If voters perceive cultural 
divisions as more salient than economic ones, then party systems in the 
advanced democracies may offer quite good representation. This is in fact 
what the evidence suggests (Bornschier 2010, 2015). Thus, we might be 
witnessing some degree of discrepancy between the “objective” interests that 
we read off voters’ social structural location, and party choice. But whether 
we like it or not, in terms of representing voters’ substantive policy 
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